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1. Introduction 
 
In 1989 Trinidad and Tobago approached the UN General Assembly to re-open discussion 
on the establishment of an international narcotics court.  The proposal was borne of a 
frustration with the inability of less developed states to investigate and prosecute 
international drug traffickers and, a perceived lack of cooperation between national law 
enforcement and judicial agencies.1 The proposal provided the impetus to a process which 
resulted in the formation of the International Criminal Court (henceforth Court or ICC). 
After a decade of negotiations the Rome Statute of the ICC included the following crimes 
under the Courts jurisdiction: crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and crimes of 
aggression. Narcotic trafficking was excluded from the Statute.2 In 2009, Trinidad and 
Tobago again lobbied for the inclusion of narcotics trafficking under Articles 121 and 125 of 
the Rome Statute.3 Narcotics’ trafficking was again excluded, due to a lack of support.4   
                                                           
1
 A. Schloenhardt, 2004, ‘Transnational Organised Crime and the International Criminal Court: 
Towards Global Criminal Justice’, Crime in Australia: International Connections, Australian Institute 
of Criminology Conference, Melbourne, 29-30 November 2004; see M. Roth, 2005, 'Comparative 
Overview of Policing, Courts and Corrections', in P. Reichel (eds.) Handbook of Transnational 
Criminal Justice (London: Sage).  
2
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9. 
3
 United Nations, 2009, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Rome, 17 July 1998: 
Trinidad and Tobago: Proposal of Amendments. C.N.737.2009.TREATIES-9. 
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International Drug Trafficking in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’. International 
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This article investigates the potential impact of inclusion of narcotic trafficking under the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Analysis uses the single case study of Afghanistan: the world’s 
largest source of illicit opiates. To establish a foundation section one will discuss the four 
main objections to the inclusion of narcotics trafficking presented during the primary 
negotiations for the ICC. The article then moves beyond legal arguments by assessing the 
potential effects of the inclusion of narcotic trafficking by applying concepts and evidence 
from the drug control, policing and crime prevention literature. The conclusion weighs up a 
number of arguments for and against the inclusion of narcotic trafficking in the Rome Statute 
of the ICC.  
 
2. Legal objections 
 
2.1 Objection one: The inclusion of narcotics crimes would trivialize the role of the court 
 
The primary objection of the Preparatory Committee of the Rome Statute was that the 
inclusion of narcotics related crimes might trivialize the role of the Court.5  Crimes under 
ICC jurisdiction must ‘shock the conscience of humanity’ or present a threat to ‘the peace, 
security and well-being of the world’.6 The exclusion of narcotics trafficking from the 
jurisdiction of the 1998 Rome Statute suggests that the drafters felt that the offence was 
neither sufficiently shocking nor threatening. This opinion, however, conflicted with a 
statement, also in 1998, by the UN General Assembly that: 
 
… drugs are a grave threat to the health and well-being of all mankind, the 
independence of States, democracy, the stability of nations, the structure of 
all societies, and the dignity and hope of millions of people and their 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy (Consulted 18 May 2011) 
http://www.humanrightsanddrugs.org/?p=768 
5
 M. McConville, 2000, ‘A Global War on Drugs: Why the United States Should Support the 
Prosecution of Drug Traffickers in the International Criminal Court’, American Criminal Law Review. 
Vol. 75, No. 4: 75-103. 
6
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, op. cit. 
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families.7  
 
Opiate consumption can be detrimental to the ‘well-being’ of many of the world’s 12 to 21 
million illicit opiate consumers.8 According to the World Health Organization opiate 
dependence represents a ‘global health problem which presents enormous economic, 
personal and public health consequences’.9 Heroin, the most commonly consumed illicit 
opiate, is generally considered one of the most harmful licit or illicit drugs to the individual 
consumer and their community.10 
 
As a threat to global ‘peace’ and ‘security’, there are links between some drug trafficking 
organizations and some insurgent/terrorist groups, including the Taliban and Al Qaeda.11 
Furthermore, related violence and corruption can present a barrier to democratic 
consolidation, economic development and the rule of law.12 With regard to ‘shocking the 
conscience of the world’, maybe, as Hilary Charlsworth argues, international law should 
concentrate on issues which effect peoples everyday lives rather than disproportionately 
                                                           
7
 United Nations General Assembly, 1998, Political Declaration on Global Drug Control. S-20/2: 
preamble. Italics added. 
8
 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report (New York, UNODC, 2011). 
9
 World Health Organisation, 2009, Guidelines for the Phychosocially Assisted Pharmacology 
Treatment of Opiate Dependence: 6. (Consulted 15 October 2009). 
www.who.int/substance_abuse/.../opioid_dependence_guidelines.pdf 
10
 L. Degenhardt, C. Day, S. Gilmour and W. Hall, 2006, ‘The "lessons" of the Australian "heroin 
shortage"’, Substance Abuse Treatment, Prevention, and Policy, Vol.1, No. 11; R. McCoun and P. 
Reuter, Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times, and Places (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001); D. Nutt, 2009, ‘Estimating Drug Harms: A Risky Business’, Eve Saville 
Lecture, Kings College Centre for Crime and Justice Studies. (Consulted 18 January 2010). 
http://www.crimeandjustice.org/opus1714/Estimating_drug_harms.pdf  
11
 V. Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington: Brookings 
Institute, 2010); See E. Björnehed, 2004, ‘Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the 
War on Terror’, Global Crime. Vol. 6, No. 3/4: 305–324.  
12
 A. Atkins, ‘The Drugs Trade as a Development Issue: Proposals for an EU Response’, Trocaire 
Development Review (Dublin: Trocaire, 1996); F.E. Thoumi, 1987, ‘Some Implications of the Growth 
of the Underground Economy in Colombia’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 
29, No. 2: 35-53; J. Windle, 2011, ‘Ominous Parallels and Optimistic Differences: Opium in China 
and Afghanistan’, Crime, Law and History, Vol 1, No. 2: 141-164. 
Windle (2012) Afghanistan, Narcotics and the ICC. Pre-print copy. 
4 
 
focusing on crises.13 
 
2.2. Objection two:  Narcotics related crimes are better dealt with bilaterally or regionally 
 
Some states, including Syria and Sweden, argued that narcotics crimes were best dealt with 
bilaterally or regionally.14 These argument centred upon the concern that the investigation of 
drug trafficking is a lengthy, expensive and complicated process, involving long-term 
planning and extensive intelligence gathering (possible including infiltration into the target 
group and the provision of immunity to informants). In short, the nature of narcotic 
trafficking makes it better suited to national investigations.15  
 
The bilateral nature of narcotics control, however, represents a major obstacle to the arrest 
and prosecution of major traffickers.16 Disputes can arise when multiple states claim 
jurisdiction over an offence or suspect, while insufficient transnational cooperation can limit 
evidence collection. In terms of extradition to states more able to prosecute, the punishable 
act must be defined as a serious criminal offence in both the requesting and receiver states. 
States may, furthermore, be unwilling to extradite or prosecute for fear of igniting violent 
protests, potentially based upon nationalistic sentiments.17 In theory, the Court removes many 
of the nationalistic barriers to extradition whilst providing a platform for cooperation and a 
mechanism to pressure states into compliance.18 
                                                           
13
 H. Charlseworth, 2002, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crises’, Modern Law Review, Vol. 65, 
No. 3: 377-392.  
14
 United Nations, 1998, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court Rome, 15 June - 17 July 1998 (Consulted 9 July 
2006). http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v1_e.pdf; United 
Nations, 1996, Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court: 
Informal group on General principles of Criminal Law. A/AC.249/1 
15
 M.H. Arsanjani, 1999, ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 1: 22-43. 
16
 See concerns of Trinidad and Tobago: United Nations, 2009, op. cit. 
17
 M. McConville, 2000, op. cit.; W.N. Gianaris, 1992, ‘The New World Order and the Need for an 
International Criminal Court’, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 16 No. 1: 88-117. 
18
 G. Bottini, 2004, ‘Universal Jurisdiction after the Creation of the International Criminal Court’, 
International Law and Politics, Vol. 36: 503-560. 
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2.3 Objection three: The inclusion of narcotics related crimes would overwhelm the Court. 
 
The 1996 Preparatory Committee, for what became the Rome Statute, declared that drug 
trafficking was: 
 
… of such a quantity as to flood the court; the court would not have the 
necessary resources to conduct the lengthy and complex investigations 
required to prosecute the crimes….19 
 
A high threshold would, however, be set.  Much like the crimes presently included under the 
Courts jurisdiction, narcotics related crimes would be bounded by severity. Articles 17 and 
53 of the Rome Statute provide the Court discretionary powers to render any case 
inadmissible if ‘not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court’. All cases 
must, additionally, be in the ‘interests of justice’.20 
 
Furthermore, in 2006 the Court’s Office of the Prosecutor published its ‘Prosecutorial 
Strategy’. This instructs the prosecution to ‘focus its efforts on the most serious crimes and 
on those who bear the greatest responsibility for these crimes’. The document lends 
substance to the vague concept of gravity by mandating the prosecutor to assess ‘the scale of 
the crimes; the nature of the crimes; the manner of commission of the crimes; and the impact 
of the crimes’.21 Trinidad and Tobago’s 2009 proposal to include trafficking under the 
Courts jurisdiction, similarly, limited prosecution to those which ‘pose a threat to the peace, 
order and security of a State or region’.22 Additionally, the annex of an early draft statute for 
an international criminal court affirmed that trafficking would need to possess an 
                                                           
19
 United Nations, 1996, Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court: Informal group on General principles of Criminal Law: paragraph 72. 
20
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, op. cit. 
21
 Cited in W.A. Schabas, 2008, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International 
Criminal Court’, Journal of International Criminal Justice Vol. 6: 731-761, p.736, Italics added. 
22
 United Nations, 2009, op. cit. 
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international character.23 
 
Furthermore, the Court is bounded by the concept of complementarily: it will only take cases 
which national courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute.24 In this regard, the ICC may be 
of use as a catalyst by coercing or directing national courts to prosecute major traffickers.25 
 
The threshold issue may be best illustrated by a brief viewing of the list of traffickers 
extradited from Afghanistan to America. America does not extradite drug mules carrying a 
couple of grams of heroin, nor would the Court. The last three major traffickers to be 
extradited by America have all been linked to the insurgency or managed the trafficking of 
large quantities of illicit drugs over a number of years.26 In short, the threshold for Court 
involvement would be set at those with the greatest responsibility for the illicit trade. 
 
2.3 Objection four: The definition of narcotics related crimes was too vague. 
 
James Crawford posited that narcotics related crimes lacked sufficient definition to be 
prosecutable under the Rome Statute.27 The three international narcotics control conventions 
are, however, quite clear in what they criminalize28 and the majority of domestic narcotic 
laws are already replicated upon them.29 Bounded by the severity threshold discussed above, 
                                                           
23
 N. Boister, 1998, ‘The Exclusion of Treaty Crimes from the Jurisdiction of the Proposed 
International Criminal Court: Law, Pragmatism and Politics’, Journal of Armed Conflict Law. Vol. 3, 
No. 1: 27-44 
24
 International Criminal Court. (Consulted 23 May 2011) http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ 
25
 See G. Bottini, 2004, op. cit. 
26
 See C.M. Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy (Congressional Research Service, 
RL32686, 2009). 
27
 J. Crawford, 1995, ‘The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court’, The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 2: 404-326. Henry Kissinger similarly argued that crimes 
against humanity and genocide were undefined: K. Roth, 2001, ‘The Case for Universal Jurisdiction’, 
Foreign Affairs, September/October: 150-154. 
28
 See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, 1988 (New York: UN, 1988): Article 3(1). 
29
 N. Boister, 1998, op. cit. 
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existing international legislation provides sufficient definitional parameters. 
 
This section has shown how there are few strong legal objections against the inclusion of 
narcotic trafficking under the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute. An equally important 
question, yet to be asked by the literature, is whether prosecuting trafficking in the ICC 
would have a noticeable effect upon national governments? The remainder of this article will 
engage this question by applying concepts and evidence from the drug control, policing and 
crime prevention literature to contemporary Afghanistan. 
 
3. Context: The Afghan criminal justice system 
 
To facilitate analysis of the effects of the ICC upon Afghanistan a brief overview of the state 
of the Afghan criminal justice system shall be provided. Afghanistan has ‘historically been 
characterized by a weak state in dynamic relations with a strong society’, resulting a series of 
complex relationships between the state and multiple ‘micro-societies’ based upon cultural, 
tribal or linguistic lines.30 Kabul presently exerts fragile control over some of the national 
territory, while parallel centres of authority exist throughout much of Afghanistan: some 
southern and eastern areas are governed entirely by the Taliban or state control is limited by 
the insurgency.31 For example, most major illicit opium poppy growing districts are largely 
inaccessible to UN agencies and non-governmental organizations as they fall under the 
authority of insurgents and/or criminal networks.32 
 
                                                           
30
 A. Saikal, ‘Afghanistan: Elite Fragmentation’, in W. Danspeckgruber, ed., Petersberg Papers on 
Afghanistan and the Region: Liechtenstein Colloquium Report 4. (New Jersey: Liechtenstein Institute 
on Self-Determination, 2009), p. 95. 
31
 See J.P. Caulkins, M.A.R. Kleiman, and J.D. Kulick, Drug Production and Trafficking, 
Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan (Centre on International 
Cooperation. New York: New York University, 2010); C.C. Fair and and S.G. Jones, 2009, Securing 
Afghanistan: Getting on Track. United States Institute of Peace Working Paper. (Consulted 28 June 
2010). http://www.usip.org/publications/securing-afghanistan-getting-track; T. Masadykov, A. 
Giustozzi and J.M. Page, Negotiating with the Taliban: Towards a Solution for the Afghan Conflict 
(London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, 2010).   
32
 United Nations of Drugs and Crime, Afghan Opium Survey 2010 (UNODC, 2011).  
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Even in areas with a significant state presence, the Government ‘has neither the capacity nor 
the legitimacy to mobilize capital or coercion’.33 Most state institutions are corrupt, lacking in 
adequate resources and trained personnel, and generally ineffective.34 The weakness in 
governance and lack of state authority is most conspicuous in the criminal justice system; 
80/90 percent of Afghans35 choose to use informal dispute resolution mechanisms, or even 
the Taliban, rather than the formal criminal justice system, which is under-resourced, 
undertrained and inefficient.36  
 
Decades of violent conflict corroded an already weak criminal justice system, limiting not 
only the material resources but also the pool of professional and trained coercive, legal and 
support personnel from which criminal justice systems are founded.  At the time of writing, 
the judicial process is slow and open to corruption, while many buildings are unfit for court.37 
 
The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for Afghan drug control. Due to high-levels of 
corruption, abuse and criminal activity,38 it has been described as a ‘locus of corruption’, 
                                                           
33
 J. Goodhand, 2008, ‘Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict 
Peacebuilding in Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, No. 3: 405-423, p. 415. 
34
 A. Saikal, 2009, op. cit; J. Windle and G. Farrell,  ‘Afghanistan’, in G. Newman and D. Chung 
(eds.), Crime and Punishment Around the World, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2010). 
35
 ISISC (Istituto Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali), 2007, An Assessment of Justice 
Sector and Rule of Law Reform in Afghanistan and the Need for a Comprehensive Plan.  (Consulted 
November 2007) http://www.rolafghanistan.esteri.it/ConferenceRol/Menu/Ambasciata/Gli_uffici/ 
36
 See A. Wardak, 2006, Jirga – A Traditional Mechanism for Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan. 
Institute for Afghan Studies. (Consulted 12 November 2008) http://www.institute-for-afghan-
studies.org/; A. Wardak, ‘The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: An Overview’, in W. Danspeckgruber, 
ed., Petersberg Papers on Afghanistan and the Region: Liechtenstein Colloquium Report 4 (New 
Jersey: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, 2009); J. Windle and G. Farrell, 2010, op. cit. 
37
 J. Windle and G. Farrell, 2010, op. cit.; J. Windle, 2011, op. cit.; see N. Grono, 2011, Rule of Law 
and the Justice System in Afghanistan: Report to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. (Consulted 
18 May 2011) http://www.crisisgroup.org 
38
 J. Windle and G. Farrell, 2010, op. cit.; see D. Mukhopadhyay, 2009, ‘Disguised Warlordism and 
Combatanthood in Balkh: The Persistence of Informal Power in the Formal Afghan State’, Conflict, 
Security & Development, Vol. 9, No. 4:  535-564. 
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composed of ‘disrespected and feared’ police officers. 39 The ‘criminalization’ of the Afghan 
National Police has been reported as a problem of epidemic proportions, including extortion 
and robbery by officers.40 Few major traffickers have been prosecuted41 and many of those 
which have been incarcerated have managed to bribe their way to freedom.42 According to 
the US State Department ‘many central, provincial, and district level government officials are 
believed to directly profit from the drug trade’,43 including police chiefs and judges.44 This 
said, there have been many improvements in the Afghan criminal justice system,45 including 
the development of the promising Criminal Justice Task Force.46 
 
For many of the Afghan political elite the opium trade is rewarding. Many ‘warlords’, 
appointed to legitimate political/bureaucratic positions after 2001, had previously exerted 
authority over aspects of the opiate trade.47 While formal ties with overt criminal activity 
                                                           
39
 N. Grono, 2009, ‘Policing in Conflict States – Lessons from Afghanistan’, International Police 
Commissioners’ Conference, The Hague, 16 June 2009. (Consulted 18 May 2011): no page number.  
http://www.crisisgroup.org 
40
 J. Windle and G. Farrell, 2010, op. cit. 
41
 C.C. Fair and S.G. Jones, 2009, op. cit.  
42
 B.A. Rubin and J. Sherman, Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of 
Crop Eradication (New York: Centre for International Cooperation, 2009). 
43
 US State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Washington: US State 
Department, 2011), p. 103; see V. Felbab-Brown, 2009. ‘The Drug Economy in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, and Military Conflict in the Region’, in E. Ahrari, V. Felbab-Brown, L. Shelley and N. 
Hussain (eds.)  Narco-Jihad: Drug trafficking and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan (The 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009). 
44
 C.C. Fair and S.G. Jones, 2009, op. cit. 
45
 A. Wardak, 2011, ‘State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan: The Need for Synergy’, 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, No. 5: 1305-1324. 
46
 In 2010 the Task Force convicted 56 Afghan officials for illicit drug related offences: US State 
Department, 2011, op. cit. 
47
 S. Baldauf and F. Bowers, 2005, ‘Afghanistan Riddled with Drug Ties,’ Christian Science Monitor, 
May 13 2005; L. Paoli, V.A. Greenfield, and P. Reuter, The World Heroin Market: Can Supply be 
Cut? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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were rejected in order to enter legitimate state institutions, several exploited their position by 
protecting ‘former’ contacts.48  
 
Importantly, many informal (and formal) power-holders insulated themselves from the 
narcotics trade. Some local governors are believed to eradicate opium poppies in their sphere 
of influence to show foreign donors their prohibitionist credentials. The interventions are, 
however, often intended to reduce competition and divert attention from their own illicit 
activities.49 
 
A less iniquitous obstruction to the state (or political elite) from perceiving suppression as in 
their best interest may be that a sharp decline in production would be economically and 
politically damaging.50 Afghanistan is one of the least developed countries in the world. The 
Government have reported that 12 million individuals survive below the poverty line; the UN 
Development Programme in 2009 ranked Afghanistan the fourth poorest country in the world 
in terms of food security.51 In 2009, opium was produced by 6 percent of the population, or 
roughly 1.5 million people.52 It was estimated that a third of the national population relied 
upon opiate generated revenue while a quarter of all economic activity was centred upon 
opium.53 Some politicians - echoing scholarly opinion - have expressed concern that the 
removal of the opium economy would strengthen the insurgency and alienate rural 
                                                           
48
 M. Shaw, ‘Drug Trafficking and the Development of Organised Crime in Post-Taliban 
Afghanistan’, in D. Buddenberg and W. Byrd, Afghanistan's Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, 
Dynamics and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy (New York: World Bank and UNODC, 
2006). 
49
 Felbab-Brown, 2009. op. cit. 
50
 J. Windle, 2011, op. cit. 
51
 W. Danspeckgruber, ‘Background and Summary’, in W. Danspeckgruber, ed., Petersberg Papers 
on Afghanistan and the Region: Liechtenstein Colloquium Report 4 (New Jersey: Liechtenstein 
Institute on Self-Determination, 2009). 
52
 United Nations of Drugs and Crime, 2011, op. cit. 
53
 See W.A. Byrd, ‘Responding to the Challenge of Afghanistan’s Opium Economy: Developing 
Lessons and Policy Implications’, in P. Keefer and N. Loayza, eds., Innocent Bystanders: Developing 
Countries and the War on Drugs (Washington: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010); B.A. Rubin and J. 
Sherman, 2009, op. cit.  
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populations.54 While the trade represents a barrier to long-term economic growth and foreign 
investment,55 support is understandably low for a policy which could remove the income of a 
third of the population, destabilise the economy and ignite anti-government feelings.56 With 
the contextual foundation in place the remainder of this article shall discuss how the inclusion 
of narcotics trafficking under the Rome Statute might impact Afghanistan.  
 
4. Potential effects 
 
4.1 Effects: Immunity 
 
A key aim of the Court is to limit immunity from prosecution.57 Immunity may result from 
intimidation, institutional ineffectiveness or, an unwillingness/inability to arrest or 
prosecute.58 As such, it is unsurprising that many Afghan traffickers enjoy immunity. High 
levels of corruption, violence, intimidation and lack of state authority in some areas facilitate 
immunity and, thus, trafficking. Additionally, the suppression of trafficking is understandably 
not a national priority for many of the political elite. President Karzai, for example, has often 
been unwilling to prosecute corrupt officials to avoid pushing allies towards supporting anti-
government forces.59 Yielding jurisdiction to the ICC would limit some of this self-interest60 
                                                           
54
 C.C. Fair and S.G. Jones, 2009, op. cit.; V. Felbab-Brown, 2009, op. cit. 
55
 World Bank, Afghanistan - State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty (Washington: 
World Bank, 2005). 
56
 J. Windle, 2011, op. cit.; There are innovative proposals for Afghan farmers to grow opium for the 
licit pharmaceutical market. While this warrants further investigation, until the state has strengthened 
it is unlikely that such a programme would benefit the Afghan people nor represent the most efficient 
means of development. See J. Windle, 2011, ‘Poppies for Medicine in Afghanistan: Historical 
Lessons from India and Turkey’, Journal of Asian and African Studies. Vol. 46, No. 6: 663-677. 
57
 R. Blattmann and K. Bowman, 2008, ‘Achievements and Problems of the International Criminal 
Court: A View From Within’, Journal of International Criminal Justice Vol. 6: 711-730, p. 722. 
58
 See K. Roth, 2001, op. cit.; A. Schloenhardt, 2004, op. cit. 
59
 C.C. Fair and S.G. Jones, 2009, op. cit.; The Afghan Government is not the first government to 
disregard the objectives of prohibition for the objectives of security. For multiple examples see: A. 
McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Chicago: Lawrence Hill 
Books, 2003). 
60
 G. Bottini, 2004, op. cit. 
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and, may reduce the pressure exerted on the Government and judiciary by insulating them 
from making and executing precarious decisions.  
 
While a functioning Court might reduce some of the intimidation and violence against the 
judiciary, the negotiations for ratification of the Rome Statute could spark a wave of protests 
and violence orchestrated by those threatened by the loss of immunity. For example, in 1980, 
Colombia ratified an extradition treaty with America. The Medellín and Cali cocaine 
trafficking networks perceived this as a threat and increased their procurement of political 
protection whilst waging a high-casualty campaign of violence against the state.61  
 
As importantly is the potential for cooperative warlords/traffickers to break away from the 
state by aligning themselves with anti-Government forces. The fragility of Afghanistan 
means that the primary consideration of any intervention must be stability and state 
extension. The realities of Afghan state building may, therefore, demand the necessity of 
brokering deals with strategically important traffickers. If this is the case then the Court’s 
prosecutors ‘may not be the best judge of whether a prosecution’62 is in the national interest.  
 
This said, a number of major traffickers have been arrested by American agents and 
extradited to America.63 While there are no available reports of protests against extradition in 
Afghanistan, similar cases in Columbia sparked nationalistic anger and provided political 
capital to anti-government forces. 64 The Court could, therefore, provide ‘a neutral 
international forum’65 which may limit nationalistic (or anti-American) protestations. 
 
The Court may additionally provide a remedy to Afghanistan’s notoriously inefficient prison 
system. Suspects would be detained in a much more secure prison, close to the ICC in The 
                                                           
61
 See F.E. Thoumi, ‘Competitive Advantages in the Production and Trafficking of Coca-Cocaine and 
Opium-Heroin in Afghanistan and the Andean Countries’, in P. Keefer and N. Loayza, (eds.) Innocent 
Bystanders: Developing Countries and the War on Drugs (Washington: Palgrave MacMillan and 
World Bank, 2010). 
62
 R. Wedgewood, 1991, ‘The International Criminal Court: An American View’, European Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 10: 93-107, p. 96. 
63
 C.C. Fair and S.G. Jones, 2009, op. cit. 
64
 See F.E. Thoumi, 2010, op. cit. 
65
 W.N. Gianaris, 1992, op. cit, p. 90. 
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Hague, until sentencing. After which they sit out their sentence in a secure prison chosen by 
the Court. The security situation in Afghanistan’s leading prison - Pol-e-Charki – has been 
described by a UN official stationed in Afghanistan as ‘shaky’. This is largely due to large-
scale corruption and insufficient resources. The official tellingly continued that ‘Pol-e-Charki 
is a great prison compared to the other prisons in the country….Most are uninhabitable’.66 
Whilst renovation of the prison system is ongoing, it has been fraught with difficulties and 
continues to exhibit significant security weaknesses,67 including cases of convicted traffickers 
being freed after paying bribes68 and the escape of 500 prisoners from Kandahar prison in 
May 2011.69  
  
In terms of law enforcement, if used effectively the Court would be able to collate evidence 
from a number of domestic and foreign jurisdictions,70 including Interpol. Allowing the 
prosecution to build a stronger case than it would by relying on evidence collected from just 
one or two jurisdictions.71 
 
Much of the aforementioned positives are somewhat symbolic. They will communicate to the 
Afghan people that: the state is unwilling to tolerate traffickers, none are immune from the 
law, all are equal before the law and the state has the capabilities to arrest and prosecute 
powerful offenders. If communicated effectively this symbolism may go some way to 
improving the low-levels of trust the Afghan peoples have in the Afghan criminal justice 
system. Illustrating the ability to bring powerful offenders to justice would additionally 
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undermine one of the Taliban’s main selling points: that it can provide quick, harsh and ‘fair’ 
justice.72 
 
The symbolism argument could, however, be reversed. While it may illustrate that the state is 
willing to enforce the law, it may conversely demonstrate the inherent weaknesses in the 
countries infant criminal justice system. The astute Afghan may read the involvement of the 
ICC for what it is: a response to the corruption, inefficiency and immunity inherent in a 
criminal justice system which protects the powerful. 
 
4.1 Effects: Deterrence  
 
In parallel to the aim of ending immunity the Court endeavours to provide a preventive 
function.73 This section shall review the crime prevention and drug control literature to 
provide an indication of whether the ICC could deter trafficking.  
 
The primary objective of drug law enforcement is to increase risks, as increased risks 
translate into increased cost. As these costs are passed on to the consumer through inflated 
prices a barrier is erected which prevents would-be consumers, whilst compelling current 
consumers into treatment. The Courts objective would, therefore, be to increase the perceived 
risk of trafficking.  
 
While much American, British and Canadian research into drug trafficking supports the 
deterrence effect of increased probability of arrest, studies tend to suggest that few traffickers 
perceive there to be much risk.74 If perceived risk is low in three of the worlds most 
developed and effective criminal justice systems then this does not bode well for 
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Afghanistan. Nicholas Dorn and colleagues, for example, note how traffickers they 
interviewed: 
 
… cited odds so small for their criminal conviction that they cannot be 
expressed meaningfully in quantitative terms. Some spoke of “like one in a 
hundred” (one person spoke of “one in four hundred”), but they made clear 
that what they meant by this was that it would be only “very bad luck” if 
such an organizer was convicted. The odds were simply too small to be 
expressed with any confidence.75  
 
Traffickers interviewed in Canada similarly reported risks as ‘moderate to low’.76 Layne and 
colleagues asked traffickers incarcerated in America what would deter them. The findings 
suggest that a one in four chance of conviction would be sufficient risk to deter, whereas 94 
percent would not be deterred by one in ten. Additionally none would be deterred by the 
prospect of a five year jail term, although all would be deterred by 25 years imprisonment.77 
 
Rational choices are constrained by information on risks and rewards available to would be 
traffickers. Decisions also depend on the individuals interpretive skills, past experiences, and 
the time available.78 As such individuals may be deterred from trafficking if they perceive the 
risk as outweighing the rewards.79 Meaning the role of the criminal justice system must be to 
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increase the perception of risk:80 make traffickers think there is a significant chance of 
punishment.  
 
A study in Britain, however, found that half of incarcerated traffickers interviewed had 
underestimated their potential sentence.81 Similarly in America the majority of traffickers had 
expected to receive a sentence of 10 years, even though the federal sentencing guideline for 
high-level trafficking was 25 years.82 Another study found that while few traffickers 
incarcerated in America were aware that they could be arrested for ‘dry’ conspiracy (i.e. 
arrested without drugs in their possession) many retrospectively suggested that this would 
represent one of three major deterrents (the other two being the threat of informants and a 
prison term of 25 years or greater).83  
 
As such if the Court and/or Afghan criminal justice system is to deter they must advertise 
potential sanctions, the chance of arrest must be perceived as high and sentence must be 
passed swiftly.84 This requires extensive intelligence. A starting point for intelligence will be 
the development of knowledge of trafficking structures, as this dictates not only the most 
appropriate strategy to employ but the potential effect of the removal of key figures. 
 
 
4.2 Effects: Trafficking structure 
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The organisational structure is the key. Effective policy and responses to 
drug smuggling require understanding the way smuggling is organised, or 
at least appreciating the diversity.85  
 
There are two primary trafficking structures: network and hierarchal. Hierarchal structures 
are composed of 'clear departmental boundaries, clean lines of authority, detailed reporting 
mechanisms and formal decision making procedures'.86 Networks, on the other hand, are 
composed of interactions between multiple small independent groups or individuals, who 
pool resources for collective goals. 87  
 
There may be hierarchal groups operating within larger networks. In some networks a solid 
inner core subcontracts work to small cells. While the cells change, the core group is more 
permanent.88 Such networks have been referred to as 'wheel networks'. The so-called 
Columbian cocaine trafficking ‘cartels’, for example, were structured with a core group at the 
centre which exerted significant authority over independent sub-contracted cells. As the 
leaders of the two major networks were killed or imprisoned between 1989 and 1996 sub-
contracted cells started to branch out, developing more loosely linked and fluid network, 
described as 'chain networks'.89 
 
Compartmentalisation of networks (i.e. many small groups insulated from others and the 
core) make it difficult for the police to infiltrate with intelligence and, trace and exploit 
linkages between cells. Network structures also limit the potential damage when law 
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enforcement penetrates their defences. If one cell is penetrated then the core can often call 
upon another cell to take its place.90 This does not suggest that the leaders of hierarchal 
organisation are not insulated: lower employees, including intermediaries and managers, 
often act as a buffer against law enforcement.91 The effect on hierarchal organisations may, 
however, be more significant and restructuring may be costlier. This said, any restructuring 
will incur costs.92  
 
Research on the structure Afghan drugs market is scant. Felbab-Brown suggests that 
approximately 20 trafficking organisations operate within the country ‘coalescing around 
important powerbrokers, both with and without links to the government’.93 It appears that this 
small number of core groups sub-contract distribution to independent traffickers (including 
insurgent groups) and pay for the compliance of local power-holders (i.e. warlords, tribal 
leaders and state employees).94 This would suggest that Afghan opiate trafficking bear’s 
closest resemblance to the wheel-network. 
 
If Afghan trafficking organisations have wheel structures then the removal of high-ranking 
managers may have a significant effect. Following the experience of Columbia it is possible 
that there will be a short-term dip in production whilst the market adapts; possible by altering 
the structure closer to a chain-network.95 Conversely, if smaller organisations are targeted, 
then this may assist larger traffickers to increase their market share. As larger traffickers are 
often connected to warlords and insurgents, the result would likely be increased revenue for 
anti-government parties.96 Therefore, the option with the least significant unintended 
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consequences, and highest payoff in terms of increasing risk, might involve targeting major 
traffickers, especially those connected to anti-government actors. 
 
Furthermore, Afghan traffickers may be categorised as what Nicholas Dorn and colleague’s 
term ‘politico-military’: they aim to ensure ‘a dominant position in existing political 
structures/states/failed states’. Interventions against such traffickers are often long-term 
processes involving the erosion of the organisations political, commercial or social support. 
Negotiations with competitors who pose less of a threat to the national security may be 
necessary.97 
 
In summary, law enforcement interventions in Afghanistan are significantly more complex, 
subtle and politically centred than building a case and arresting the bad guy. Such a strategy 
may even be counterproductive due to some traffickers’ military and political power, 
geographical and political isolation, and the weakness of the Afghan criminal justice system. 
Rather, the state must work from the ground up by destroying the foundation upon which the 
trafficker’s power is built upon. 
 
 
5. Should we negotiate? 
 
An issue raised by Barnet Ruben and Jake Sherman is whether to negotiate with traffickers. 
Many traffickers possess the entrepreneurial skills and knowledge of agricultural trading 
needed to advance the licit Afghan economy. For this reason, and to avoid increased conflict, 
negotiation may sometimes be more appropriate than arrest/prosecution. Negotiations, for 
example, may centre upon a covenant that traffickers receive immunity for past crimes if they 
invest in infrastructure, social welfare and/or legitimate business; whilst agreeing to cease 
their involvement in trafficking. It is envisaged that this would release resources to ensure the 
arrest of high-level traffickers connected to the insurgency: those who pose the greatest risk 
to Afghan security and stability.98 
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This option may be attractive. Many Afghan governors who may, or may not, be linked to the 
trade have expressed displeasure at the opium trade for conflicting with Islamic law.99 Others, 
who view themselves as business people,100 may see value in the legitimisation of their 
assets. If the Court can increase the perceived risk of trafficking then it may provide the 
Government with leverage to negotiate with traffickers to invest their capital, or for power-
holders to break their links to the trade. The Court may, furthermore, represent an effective 
barrier to the potential corruption of the target selection process.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This article began by illustrating the weaknesses of the legal objections against prosecuting 
narcotics trafficking under the jurisdiction of the ICC. The article then used the case study of 
Afghanistan to investigate the potential effect that inclusion would have upon a country at the 
heart of the international illicit opiate trade.  
 
It is suggested that there is potential for the Court to have a significant positive effect on 
Afghanistan in a number of ways. The strongest arguments are that inclusion would limit 
immunity from prosecution, make it more difficult to intimidate the judiciary, reduce the 
potential for escape after sentencing and provide much needed leverage in negotiations with 
traffickers. Better international cooperation may also make intelligence collection more 
effective. This may free the overstretched Afghan criminal justice system to concentrate on 
crimes of greater concern to the Afghan people.  
 
Furthermore, many of the largest traffickers have residence, or hide their assets, outside of 
Afghanistan.101 For example, in 2009 between US$1 and US$2.5 billion is believed to have 
left the country for the Arab Emirates.102 An additional positive effect, not discussed so far, 
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may be the utility of the Court in reducing the ability of traffickers to hide themselves or their 
money outside of Afghanistan. 
 
The Court would need to be aware that the effect of its actions will depend on the structure of 
the Afghan drugs markets. Possessing a hierarchal or wheel-network structure means that a 
number of high-level arrests would likely significantly increase the price of Afghan opiates. 
The Court will then need to adapt its strategy in response to market reorganisation. 
Furthermore, the politico-military structure of Afghan trafficking means that the Court would 
likely have to play a political role in which the objectives of justice are put to one side during 
negotiations: the Court may have to accept that achieving a prosecution of one trafficker 
requires negotiation and compliance with another trafficker. It may also be that there are 
times when arresting and prosecuting a trafficker will not be in the long-term interest of state 
building, even if in the shorter-term interests of justice.  
 
Negative effects might include traffickers being able to influence the Government to persuade 
the Court to target competitors and, the potential for ratification negotiations to escalate into 
violence and political opposition. Furthermore, as it is possible that negotiations may be more 
appropriate than law enforcement, the Courts prosecutors would be required to play a 
political role in which short-term law enforcement objectives are prioritised below long-term 
security and state building goals. Potentially conflicting with the law enforcement aims of the 
Court, especially the ending of immunity. (Even though institutional development, reduced 
conflict and state extension may be considered the most important long-term law enforcement 
objectives.)   
 
The symbolism of the Court provides both a positive and negative, depending upon the 
perspective. It could be perceived as either an indication of the commitment of the state to the 
rule of law or a confession of the limitations of the Afghan criminal justice system.  
 
In summary, the Court has the potential to either positively or negatively influence 
Afghanistan depending upon the discretion and priorities of the Courts prosecutors. This said, 
the primary objective in Afghanistan must be the formation of an effective criminal justice 
system. If foreign resources were displaced from the development of the Afghan criminal 
justice system into the ICC budget then it would become a burden; for there is greater utility 
in developing an effective Afghan criminal justice system than arresting a few major 
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traffickers. If, however, the Court worked with the Afghan police and judiciary to improve 
their capabilities whilst freeing their resources for more traditional policing then the Court 
would likely be a great asset to the peoples of Afghanistan. 
